If a society can rely on the epistemic virtue of sincerity as a whole, people can trust it to bring benefits to the collective. However, if sincerity only holds instrumental value, individuals might abandon it whenever it serves their personal interests. Therefore, we treat sincerity as an indispensable quality that possesses intrinsic value. We regard sincerity as a moral virtue not out of some baseless moral obligation, but because valuing sincerity in itself is a fundamental requirement for a stable society.
如果一个社会能够整体仰赖真诚这种认知美德,人们就可以相信它能为大众带来福祉。然而,如果真诚仅仅具有工具价值,人们就可能为了个人利益随时抛弃它。正因如此,我们将真诚视为不可丢弃且具有内在价值的品质。我们把真诚当作一种道德美德,并不是出于某种凭空而来的道德义务,而是因为将真诚本身视为美德,是维持社会稳定的基本要求。
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