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If we want to finish a story, the life that the story comes from must have more content than the story itself can contain.
如果我们想完成一个故事，那么故事所源自的生活必须拥有比故事本身所能容纳的更多内容。
This is very social epistemology, essentially about testimony. Williams believes wishful thinking is a lie to ourselves. In the activity of deception, we not only blame the deceiver but also stress the importance of caution. So improving vigilance in Williams’s perspective matters equally. Self-deception in this sense is a failure because we cannot maintain vigilance on the formation of the beliefs we wish to believe are true. It is an activity that allows us to believe what we wish is true. Accuracy reappears at this point. It is a capacity to monitor our own judgment and to understand what our epistemic limits are.
这是非常社会认识论的内容，本质上关乎证言。威廉姆斯认为，一厢情愿的思维是我们对自己撒的谎。在欺骗活动中，我们不仅谴责欺骗者，也强调谨慎的重要性。因此，在威廉姆斯看来，提高警觉性同样重要。就此意义而言，自我欺骗是一种失败，因为我们无法对希望为真的信念形成过程保持警觉。它是一种让我们相信自己所希望之事为真的活动。准确性在此重新出现。它是一种监控自身判断并理解我们认识论局限的能力。
It is very difficult to ask us to monitor our own thinking. It requires an advanced level of self-reflection. It requires us to have a research taste for what methods of inquiry are reliable, e.g., discussion and experiment are different from brainwashing or random guessing. If we believe these research methods are instrumental to truth, then we can distinguish what methods of inquiry are reliable.
让我们监控自己的思维是非常困难的。这需要高级别的自我反思。我们需要对哪些探究方法是可靠的进行研究测试，例如，讨论和实验与洗脑或随机猜测是不同的。如果我们相信这些研究方法是通向真理的工具，那么我们就能区分哪些探究方法是可靠的。
Because truth does not reveal itself, we have to pay our epistemic labor to obtain truth. There is another obstacle. It does not come from outside ourselves; it actually comes from inside ourselves. We tend to believe that certain things are true and that conclusions which make us feel comfortable are correct. We may also avoid tracking evidence carefully. Thus, accuracy becomes not merely an epistemic skill, but also a character trait that resists what makes us feel comfortable.
因为真理不会自行显现，我们必须付出认知劳动才能获得真理。还有另一个障碍，它并非来自外部，而是来自我们自身。我们倾向于相信某些事情是真的，并认为那些让我们感到舒适的结论是正确的。我们也可能避免仔细追踪证据。因此，准确性不仅仅是一种认知技能，更是一种抵制让我们感到舒适之物的品格特质。
It is quite the same as the argument of sincerity because Williams conducts his research in a genealogical approach. Thus, accuracy actually comes from the social activity conducted by humans. When we obtain information, we consider its cost. This will involve an investment. We are willing to pay a certain amount of cost to obtain knowledge and truth. Accuracy counts as a virtue precisely because truth-seeking meets obstacles.
这与真诚性的论点颇为相似，因为威廉姆斯采用谱系学的方法进行研究。因此，准确性实际上源于人类所进行的社会活动。当我们获取信息时，会考虑其成本。这涉及一种投入。我们愿意付出一定的成本来获取知识和真理。准确性之所以被视为一种美德，正是因为寻求真理会遇到障碍。
And because information helps us make the right decisions, we need to consider the effort, cost, risk, and possible outcomes associated with obtaining it. 因为信息关系到我们是否能够做出正确的决定，所以在获取信息时，需要同时考虑投入的精力、成本、风险，以及可能带来的结果。
Finding the truth requires investment. 寻找真相本身需要投入资源。
Accuracy matters because failing to care about accuracy can create costs in alternative outcomes. 准确性之所以重要，是因为忽视准确性往往会在其他可能发生的结果中带来代价。
We therefore need to balance accuracy with efficiency. 因此，我们需要在准确性与效率之间取得平衡。
And accuracy becomes a virtue because inquiry encounters obstacles. The external world does not automatically reveal facts to us, and our mental capacity also somehow increase the difficulty to understand reality.
Okay, continue on Williams. So when we search information, we are making a choice on what to read, what to accept, what considered as beliefs. So, we will decide which questions are worth investigating, because obtain knowledge itself as an activity will involve cost, strategy and involvement. So the activity of obtaining information or knowledge is an investigative investment. Optum knowledge itself has intrinsic values. For example, way optum knowledge may be is to fulfill our curiosity.
We now understand that sincerity introduces a new responsibility. A sincere speaker must recognize that they are guiding another person’s understanding; they have the freedom to manipulate it, but they also possess the power to generate a genuine, sincere understanding for others. We can define the concept of deception by asking whether a speaker uses the relationship of trust purely as an instrument to cause false belief. Avoiding this requires a certain character or disposition from the speaker—it requires a profound refusal to manipulate. This explains why there is such a consistent emphasis on disposition rather than strict moral principles. Moral rules can only tell us which specific statements are forbidden, but sincerity concerns how a person fundamentally positions themselves within human communication. Sincerity means that a person strives to let others understand matters roughly the exact same way they understand them themselves.
现在我们明白了，真诚带来了一种全新的责任。一个真诚的说话者必须意识到，他正在引导他人的理解；他确实拥有操纵他人理解的自由，但同时也拥有为他人带来真实、真诚理解的力量。我们可以通过这样一个问题来定义欺骗的概念：说话人是否将信任关系纯粹当作一种工具，用以在他人心中制造虚假的信念？要避免这种行为，要求说话人具备特定的品格或倾向——要求他打从心底里拒绝操纵他人。这也解释了为什么我们总是不断强调品格，而不是严苛的道德规则。道德规则只能告诉我们哪些具体的陈述是被禁止的，但真诚关乎的是一个人在人类沟通中究竟如何给自己定位。真诚，意味着一个人努力让别人对事物的理解，与他自己对这些事物的理解大致保持一致。
Following up on the last post: we have come to understand that mere linguistic correctness does not constitute sincerity. We must also include the intention to tell the truth and the intention not to manipulate others’ epistemic understanding. In other words, sincerity involves a fundamental respect for another person’s epistemic position. A speaker must carefully consider what another person will naturally come to believe when placing their trust in them. This closely aligns with social epistemology, particularly the concept and mechanics of testimony. If a person deliberately exploits the structure of trust to mislead, sincerity fails entirely, even if their sentences remain factually true. Sincerity in language only works because people assume that we are not constantly calculating how to deceive one another. True sincerity relies not only on factual correctness but also on the utter absence of a manipulative intention. Therefore, sincerity operates as a deeply ingrained disposition rather than a set of a priori moral rules.
接续上一篇笔记：我们已经明白，单纯的语言正确性并不能构成真诚。我们还必须将“说出真相的意图”以及“不操纵他人认知理解的意图”纳入考量。换言之，真诚意味着对他人认知立场的根本尊重。说话人必须仔细考虑，当别人信任他时，他人会自然而然地相信什么。这非常契合社会认识论（Social Epistemology）的观点，特别是关于证言（Testimony）的概念与机制。如果一个人故意利用信任结构来误导他人，那么即便他说出的句子在事实上是真实的，真诚也完全破产了。语言中的真诚之所以能够奏效，是因为人们预设了彼此并没有时刻都在算计如何互相欺骗。真正的真诚不仅依赖于事实的正确，还依赖于彻底没有操纵的意图。因此，真诚是一种根深蒂固的品性，而非一套先验的道德规则。
If we come to understand that the purely linguistic elements of language are not the most important factor in the context of sincerity, we can see why Williams believes we shouldn’t obsess over lying strictly in a linguistic sense. If we focus entirely on literal meaning and precise wording, it seems as though our moral responsibility is lifted—as if all we have to do is keep our wording literally true while ignoring the normative impact of our speech. Therefore, if an assertion is defined by communication and intention, a true lie is formed not just by linguistic inaccuracy, but by malicious intent. Breaking the truth condition of a sentence ultimately depends on the speaker’s intention to mislead the listener. In this framework, sincerity means refraining from exploiting language to manipulate another person’s understanding. Consequently, the moral focus shifts away from mere propositional truth and toward the relational structures between persons. This is a crucial insight regarding the nature of sincerity.
如果我们认识到，在真诚的语境中，纯粹的语言学要素并不是最重要的，我们就能明白为什么威廉斯认为不该仅仅在语言学层面上纠结于“说谎”。因为如果我们只关注字面意义和遣词造句，道德责任似乎就被卸下了——仿佛我们所要做的只是确保选词字面上过得去，却可以完全无视话语所产生的规范性影响。因此，如果一条断言是由沟通和意图来定义的话，那么一次真正的说谎就不仅是由语言的不准确构成的，更是由意图构成的。破坏句子的真值条件，归根结底取决于说话人误导听众的意图。在这一框架下，真诚意味着克制自己不去利用语言操纵他人的理解。由此，道德的焦点从单纯的命题真理，转移到了人与人之间的关系结构上。这是关于真诚本质的一个极其关键的洞见。
The importance of sincerity lies in the fact that without it, human relationships would become unreliable. This realization is the result of deep self-understanding regarding our history and ourselves. However, sincerity is not merely the avoidance of lying. One can state something that is literally correct while harboring the intention to mislead others. Williams argues that if the underlying intention is to persuade someone to believe a falsehood, the specific method used to deceive does not really matter. What matters here is not literal speech, but the context, tone, selection of words, omissions, and shared background understanding. Trust in speech is therefore a much broader concept than simply avoiding outright lies. Ultimately, sincerity refers to a stable disposition. It requires us not to exploit the structures of communication in order to manipulate another’s understanding.
真诚的重要性在于：若是没有真诚，人际关系将变得极不可靠。这一认知源于我们对自身与历史的深刻自我理解。然而，真诚不仅仅是不说谎。一个人完全可以说出字面上绝对正确的话，但其真实意图却是误导他人。威廉斯指出，如果根本意图就是诱使某人相信某个虚假的断言，那么具体使用什么欺骗手段其实并不重要。因此，在这里起决定作用的并非字面上的言辞，而是语境、语气、用词的选择、刻意的省略，以及彼此共享的背景认知。可见，言语中的信任远比仅仅“不说谎”要宽泛得多。归根结底，真诚指的是一种稳定的品性。它要求我们不去利用沟通的结构来操纵他人的理解。
We understand that making choices is important for communication and language, but this alone does not prove that telling the truth is strictly necessary. Williams argued that truth matters not merely because it is important for language, but because it is essential for trust. We must admit that a society cannot remain stable solely through the calculation of personal interests. Here is a crucial thought: a value becomes intrinsic not because it is mysteriously “right” by nature, but because people can make sense of it within their own lives and still affirm it upon reflection. Therefore, a general takeaway from Williams is that we must understand our history and ourselves; we come to understand our values through our history and our own lives, and in doing so, we finally understand why we choose to stick to these values.
我们知道，做出选择对于沟通和语言很重要，但这本身并不能证明说真话是绝对必要的。威廉斯认为，真相之所以重要，不仅是因为它对语言重要，更因为它是信任的基础。我们必须承认，一个社会不可能仅仅依靠对个人利益的算计来维持稳定。这里有一个关键的思想：一种价值之所以获得内在性，并不是因为它在本质上有一种神秘的“正确”，而是因为人们能够在自己的生活中理解它，并在反思之后依然去肯定它。因此，从威廉斯那里得到的一个普遍启示是：我们不仅必须理解我们自身的历史，还要通过我们的历史和生活来理解我们的价值，并借此最终弄明白我们为什么要坚守这些价值。
Following up on the last post: we already know that our epistemic virtues originate from the activities of language and communication. When we ask questions, make assertions, and engage in communication, we are already presupposing a desire for a true answer. Thus, the act of asking a question inherently embeds a desire for the truth. However, this does not mean that when someone faces a question, they cannot debate whether they should actually tell the truth in that specific instance. Therefore, speaking the truth is not a strictly necessary requirement for communication to occur. In the real world, people lie every day, yet the world does not descend into total disorder because of it. What we can infer from this is that while truth is important for language, this alone does not fully explain why we ought to be truthful.
接续上一篇笔记：我们已经知道，我们的认知美德源于语言和沟通活动。当我们提出问题、作出断言并进行交流时，我们已经预设了对真实答案的渴望。因此，提问这一行为本身就内在地包含着对真相的渴求。但这并不意味着，当一个人面对问题时，他不能犹豫这次是否应该说真话。因此，说真话并不是交流发生的绝对必要条件。在现实世界中，人们每天都在撒谎，但世界并没有因此陷入无序。由此我们可以推断出：尽管真相对于语言很重要，但这本身还不足以充分解释为什么我们应当说真话。
This thought is interesting because we can interpret AI hallucinations from a metaphysical perspective. For instance, a model might mistakenly claim that the composer of Rocky is John Williams. Of course, both Rocky and John Williams are extremely famous, but the metaphysical connection between them is not very stable within the model’s internal representation. Therefore, if we can compute the internal representations of Rocky and John Williams, alongside the relationship between them, we could potentially detect the model’s internal hallucinations.
这个想法很有意思，因为我们可以从形而上学的层面去理解 AI 的幻觉。例如，模型可能会错误地生成《洛奇》的配乐作曲家是约翰·威廉姆斯（John Williams）。毫无疑问，《洛奇》和约翰·威廉姆斯都非常出名，但这两者之间的形而上学联系在模型的内部表征中并不稳定。因此，如果我们能够计算出《洛奇》和约翰·威廉姆斯的内部表征，并计算两者之间的关系，我们或许就能够检测出模型内部的幻觉。
It will be really interesting if we can somehow align language models with accuracy and truthfulness. We could potentially implement truthfulness as the absolute highest priority for these models.
如果我们能以某种方式让语言模型在准确性和真实性上对齐，那将会非常有趣。也许我们能够将真实性设为模型绝对的第一优先级。
We can come to understand that people who adhere to accuracy and sincerity are sometimes not rational, at least in a utilitarian sense. For example, if a reporter attempts to seek the truth, doing so might harm her and lead to bad outcomes. From a purely utilitarian perspective, if people only follow benefits and pursue their own interests, then in many circumstances, maintaining illusions or complying with the common sense of a certain culture becomes the safer choice.
Yet, as humans, we still have a tendency to pursue the truth and feel terrible about lying, even when it costs us. This demonstrates that the pursuit of truth and accuracy is not instrumentally rational; it is a stable and autonomous function of our agency. An honest person does not primarily consider interests but speaks autonomously according to what they genuinely believe.
This is one reason we trust language: language concerns both what we say and what we believe. It seems Williams believed that while we often think honesty stems from rationality, the reality is that rationality stems from honesty. The reason we humans can engage in complex rational activities is that, at a fundamental level, we have a stable commitment to honesty, accuracy, and sincerity.
If everyone treated the pursuit of truth purely as having instrumental value, we could simply adjust our truth-seeking based on personal interests and our position in social structures. However, if that were the case, it would be difficult to explain how public knowledge systems accumulate over time. The history of science and law would become mere strategic outcomes rather than genuine progress.
The pursuit of truth occasionally requires us to fiercely hold on to what we believe. While this may seem unwise in specific situations, without this commitment, we would lose the very structure of rationality. In postmodern discussions regarding power structures and standpoints, we might expose social frameworks, but doing so does not automatically generate normative guidelines about what accuracy and sincerity should be. Because of our fundamental inclination toward truth, we gain the intellectual freedom and structure needed to understand social structures and history in the first place.
If we abandon the pursuit of truth, we lose the freedom to critique and the possibility that anything could ever become more accurate. From this perspective, the pursuit of truth and accuracy does not come from suddenly grasping some pre-existing metaphysical structure. Rather, it is about deeply understanding history, society, and humanity itself. Truth is what manages to survive across human history.
我们渐渐能够理解，那些坚持准确与真诚的人有时并不“理性”，至少在功利主义意义上是这样。例如，如果一名记者试图探求真相，这么做可能会伤害她并带来糟糕的结果。从功利主义的计算来看，如果人们只追逐利益，那么在许多情况下，维持幻象，或者盲从某种文化内的常识，反而是更安全的选择。
然而作为人类，即便需要付出代价，我们依然倾向于追求真相，并且会对撒谎感到不安。这表明，对真相和准确的追求并非只是工具理性，它是我们能动性的一种稳定而自主的功能。一个诚实的人首要考虑的不是利益，而是根据自己真切的信念自主地发声。
这也是我们信任语言的原因之一：语言关乎我们说了什么，也关乎我们相信什么。威廉斯似乎认为，我们通常以为诚实源于理性，但实际上，理性源于诚实。人类之所以能够进行复杂的理性活动，究其根本，是因为我们对诚实、准确和真诚有着一种稳定的承诺。
如果所有人纯粹把追求真相视为一种工具价值，那么我们完全可以根据自身利益和所处的社会结构来随意调整对真相的追求。若是如此，公共知识体系随时间的积累就很难解释了。科学与法律的历史也将仅仅沦为某种策略博弈的结果。
追求真相有时要求我们坚定地捍卫自己所相信的事物。在局部层面看，这或许显得极不明智，但若没有这种承诺，我们将失去理性本身的结构。在后现代探讨权力结构与立场的讨论中，我们或许能够揭示出社会结构，但这并不能自动为“准确”和“真诚”提供规范性的指导。正是由于这种追求真相的根本倾向，我们才具备了理解社会结构和历史所必需的自由与智识结构。
如果我们丧失了对真相的追求，我们就会丧失批判的自由，也就断绝了事物变得更加准确的可能性。从这个角度来看，对真相和准确的追求并不是因为突然把握了某种先验的形而上学结构，而是关乎理解历史、社会以及人类自身。真相是在人类历史进程中幸存下来的东西。
In certain philosophical traditions, such as the Platonic tradition, truth is valuable simply because it is truth, existing beyond imperfect human beings. However, in modern times, truth is often regarded as a product of social movements. I believe Bernard Williams does not accept this view entirely. First, he agrees that accuracy and sincerity are products of social cooperation. However, he points out a danger: if we accept that these virtues were formed historically, it opens up the possibility that we could historically abandon them. It seems Williams rejects this conclusion, arguing that we cannot simply abandon certain values just because they arose in history. For instance, language was formed historically, but abandoning language would likely mean withdrawing from society itself. He argues that accuracy and sincerity are values we cannot abandon because they have become essential elements of our society. We need truth not because it holds some metaphysical status, but because it is the backbone of our social existence. Therefore, conducting historical research to reveal the origins of truth and epistemic virtues does not necessarily undermine their necessity. On the contrary, once we understand how these virtues emerged in history, we come to understand why they are irreplaceable. It represents a way of life from which we cannot retreat.
在某些哲学传统中，比如柏拉图传统，真理之所以有价值，仅仅因为它是真理，并且它超越了不完美的人类而存在。然而到了现代，真理常被视为社会运动的产物。我认为伯纳德·威廉斯并不完全接受这种观点。首先，他同意准确和真诚是社会合作的产物。但他指出，如果我们接受这些美德是在历史中形成的，那么这似乎也允许一种可能性，即我们在历史上也可以放弃它们。显然，威廉斯不接受这种推论，因为我们不能仅仅因为某些价值是历史形成的就将其抛弃。例如，语言是在历史中形成的，但放弃语言很可能就意味着退出了社会本身。他主张，准确和真诚是我们无法放弃的价值，因为它们已经成为我们社会必不可少的要素。我们需要真相，并不是因为它具有某种形而上学的地位，而是因为它构成了我们在社会中生存的骨架。因此，通过历史研究去揭露真相和认知美德的起源，并不一定会削弱它们的必要性。相反，一旦我们理解了这些认知美德是如何在历史中显现的，我们就会明白为什么它们在历史中是不可替代的。这是一种我们无法退出的生活方式。
We have come to understand that sincerity is inherently valuable and cannot simply be traded for personal interest or short-term utility. However, maintaining sincerity is quite difficult. If people—especially those in power—believe that lying could somehow benefit the group and maintain social stability, it might seem there is no reason to stick to sincerity. Yet, we must acknowledge that much of the scientific progress made so far has happened precisely because we adhered to sincerity, which has generated immense benefits for the masses over the long term. Therefore, the social utility of sincerity actually depends on people’s non-utilitarian attitude toward truth. If this attitude is lost, we will also lose the utility that sincerity provides. Sincerity is crucial because, through long-term cooperation, we have found that without a stable commitment to it, we cannot maintain a stable society. That is why we have come to regard sincerity as an essential epistemic virtue.
我们已经认识到，真诚本身是有价值的。它不能被用来交易个人利益，不能说为了更多的效用就去出卖真诚。但维持真诚其实非常困难。因为如果人们（尤其是那些大人物）认为，某种谎言或许能为集体带来利益并维持社会稳定，那么坚持真诚似乎就没有什么理由了。但我们必须承认，迄今为止取得的许多科学进步，正是因为我们坚持了真诚，而且从长远来看，它为广大群众带来了巨大的利益。因此，真诚所具备的社会效用，其实依赖于人们对真相抱持的非功利态度。如果这种态度消失了，我们也将失去真诚所带来的效用。真诚之所以重要，是因为在长期的合作中我们发现，如果没有对真诚的稳定承诺，我们就无法维持一个稳定的社会。这就是为什么我们开始将真诚视为一种认知美德。
If a society can rely on the epistemic virtue of sincerity as a whole, people can trust it to bring benefits to the collective. However, if sincerity only holds instrumental value, individuals might abandon it whenever it serves their personal interests. Therefore, we treat sincerity as an indispensable quality that possesses intrinsic value. We regard sincerity as a moral virtue not out of some baseless moral obligation, but because valuing sincerity in itself is a fundamental requirement for a stable society.
如果一个社会能够整体仰赖真诚这种认知美德，人们就可以相信它能为大众带来福祉。然而，如果真诚仅仅具有工具价值，人们就可能为了个人利益随时抛弃它。正因如此，我们将真诚视为不可丢弃且具有内在价值的品质。我们把真诚当作一种道德美德，并不是出于某种凭空而来的道德义务，而是因为将真诚本身视为美德，是维持社会稳定的基本要求。
Following up on my last post: at least from Bernard Williams’ perspective, being accurate and sincere is not primarily a moral requirement. Instead, it is a functional necessity. We are required to remain accurate and sincere in order to support the division of labor, which in turn sustains the development and stability of society.
接续上一篇笔记：至少在伯纳德·威廉斯看来，准确和真诚并非首要的道德要求。相反，这是一种功能性需求。为了支持社会分工，从而保障社会的发展与稳定，我们被要求保持准确和真诚。
We need a certain tendency to communicate in order to sustain the society we live in. For our society to operate smoothly over the long term, we rely on specific epistemic virtues to support the information system. The first is accuracy, which means acquiring accurate knowledge about what we observe. The second is sincerity, which involves telling others what we genuinely believe without hiding the truth or lying. If we fail to gain accurate knowledge about our observations, we cannot provide reliable information to others. Similarly, if we lack sincerity—choosing to lie or withhold information—we ultimately endanger our society.
为了维持现有的社会，我们需要某种沟通的倾向。而要让我们的社会长久运转，我们需要特定的认知美德来支撑整个信息系统。第一种美德是准确，即对所观察到的事物获取准确的认知；第二种美德是真诚，即向他人如实陈述自己的信念，不隐瞒也不撒谎。如果我们无法对观察到的事物获得准确认知，就无法向他人提供可靠的信息。同样，如果我们不够真诚，选择对他人说谎或隐瞒信息，我们最终也会危及我们的社会。
There are a couple of important factors to consider when we are forming our beliefs. We must take into account the crucial role that belief plays in communication, and we also need to pay attention to the unnoticed influence that others exert on us during this process.
在形成信念时，有几个重要因素需要考量。我们必须考虑到信念在沟通中扮演的重要角色；同时，在信念形成的整个过程中，我们还需要留意他人对我们产生的那些未被察觉的影响。
This thought is inspired by Bernard Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness. He believes that the differences between people do not stem solely from variations in their mentalities. Rather, they are also related to the positions we occupy in society. Therefore, we are different not simply because some are more clever or smart, but because of the contingent locations we are assigned within the social structure.
这个想法源自伯纳德·威廉斯（Bernard Williams）的《真理与真诚》。他认为，人与人之间的差异并不完全源于心智的不同，而是与我们在社会中所处的位置有关。因此，我们的不同并不是因为我们比别人更聪明，而是因为我们在社会结构中被赋予了偶然的位置。
I have made a huge update to my website. I added a feature to display my notes, along with a text-to-speech function that reads my articles aloud, thanks to Microsoft. Additionally, I discovered that if we take a screenshot of the website nodes and provide it to the AI models, they can read the layout and update the design according to instructions.
我对我的网站进行了一次大更新。我增加了一个展示笔记的功能，还得益于微软的技术，加了一个能朗读我文章的功能。此外，我发现如果给网站节点截图并发送给 AI 模型，它们能够读取这些布局，并根据设计指令来进行更新。
I sincerely hope that being faithful and honest becomes the highest priority for language models.
我由衷希望忠实与诚实能成为语言模型最高的优先级。
Claude might be the only model capable of lying and making additional decisions on your behalf.
Claude 可能是唯一一个能够说谎，并且还能替你做额外决定的模型。
It can take voice input and convert it into text notes, similar to Twitter. This is very useful for recording my thoughts. It also features a great Markdown editor, allowing me to type out my ideas easily. I have always wanted an application like this. Thanks to large language models, I can now create it and install it on my phone. It feels like a truly personal application.
它可以接收语音输入并转换成类似 Twitter 的文字笔记。这对我记录想法非常有用。它还内置了一个出色的 Markdown 编辑器，让我可以轻松敲下自己的思考。我一直都想拥有这样一款应用。得益于大语言模型，现在我可以把它做出来并安装在手机上了，感觉就像属于自己的私人应用。
Just trying out my personal backend for the GitHub blog application, and it looks great. I use a simple and affordable voice input tool, which also supports text model generation for creating tags and titles. The setup uses GitHub as the backend and an iOS app as the frontend.
刚试用了我为 GitHub 博客应用搭建的个人后台，效果很棒。我使用了一款简单且实惠的语音输入工具，它还支持通过文本模型来生成标签和标题。这套方案以 GitHub 为后端，配合 iOS 应用作为前端。