Following up on the last post: we have come to understand that mere linguistic correctness does not constitute sincerity. We must also include the intention to tell the truth and the intention not to manipulate others’ epistemic understanding. In other words, sincerity involves a fundamental respect for another person’s epistemic position. A speaker must carefully consider what another person will naturally come to believe when placing their trust in them. This closely aligns with social epistemology, particularly the concept and mechanics of testimony. If a person deliberately exploits the structure of trust to mislead, sincerity fails entirely, even if their sentences remain factually true. Sincerity in language only works because people assume that we are not constantly calculating how to deceive one another. True sincerity relies not only on factual correctness but also on the utter absence of a manipulative intention. Therefore, sincerity operates as a deeply ingrained disposition rather than a set of a priori moral rules.

接续上一篇笔记：我们已经明白，单纯的语言正确性并不能构成真诚。我们还必须将“说出真相的意图”以及“不操纵他人认知理解的意图”纳入考量。换言之，真诚意味着对他人认知立场的根本尊重。说话人必须仔细考虑，当别人信任他时，他人会自然而然地相信什么。这非常契合社会认识论（Social Epistemology）的观点，特别是关于证言（Testimony）的概念与机制。如果一个人故意利用信任结构来误导他人，那么即便他说出的句子在事实上是真实的，真诚也完全破产了。语言中的真诚之所以能够奏效，是因为人们预设了彼此并没有时刻都在算计如何互相欺骗。真正的真诚不仅依赖于事实的正确，还依赖于彻底没有操纵的意图。因此，真诚是一种根深蒂固的品性，而非一套先验的道德规则。