If we come to understand that the purely linguistic elements of language are not the most important factor in the context of sincerity, we can see why Williams believes we shouldn’t obsess over lying strictly in a linguistic sense. If we focus entirely on literal meaning and precise wording, it seems as though our moral responsibility is lifted—as if all we have to do is keep our wording literally true while ignoring the normative impact of our speech. Therefore, if an assertion is defined by communication and intention, a true lie is formed not just by linguistic inaccuracy, but by malicious intent. Breaking the truth condition of a sentence ultimately depends on the speaker’s intention to mislead the listener. In this framework, sincerity means refraining from exploiting language to manipulate another person’s understanding. Consequently, the moral focus shifts away from mere propositional truth and toward the relational structures between persons. This is a crucial insight regarding the nature of sincerity.
如果我们认识到,在真诚的语境中,纯粹的语言学要素并不是最重要的,我们就能明白为什么威廉斯认为不该仅仅在语言学层面上纠结于“说谎”。因为如果我们只关注字面意义和遣词造句,道德责任似乎就被卸下了——仿佛我们所要做的只是确保选词字面上过得去,却可以完全无视话语所产生的规范性影响。因此,如果一条断言是由沟通和意图来定义的话,那么一次真正的说谎就不仅是由语言的不准确构成的,更是由意图构成的。破坏句子的真值条件,归根结底取决于说话人误导听众的意图。在这一框架下,真诚意味着克制自己不去利用语言操纵他人的理解。由此,道德的焦点从单纯的命题真理,转移到了人与人之间的关系结构上。这是关于真诚本质的一个极其关键的洞见。
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