In certain philosophical traditions, such as the Platonic tradition, truth is valuable simply because it is truth, existing beyond imperfect human beings. However, in modern times, truth is often regarded as a product of social movements. I believe Bernard Williams does not accept this view entirely. First, he agrees that accuracy and sincerity are products of social cooperation. However, he points out a danger: if we accept that these virtues were formed historically, it opens up the possibility that we could historically abandon them. It seems Williams rejects this conclusion, arguing that we cannot simply abandon certain values just because they arose in history. For instance, language was formed historically, but abandoning language would likely mean withdrawing from society itself. He argues that accuracy and sincerity are values we cannot abandon because they have become essential elements of our society. We need truth not because it holds some metaphysical status, but because it is the backbone of our social existence. Therefore, conducting historical research to reveal the origins of truth and epistemic virtues does not necessarily undermine their necessity. On the contrary, once we understand how these virtues emerged in history, we come to understand why they are irreplaceable. It represents a way of life from which we cannot retreat.

在某些哲学传统中，比如柏拉图传统，真理之所以有价值，仅仅因为它是真理，并且它超越了不完美的人类而存在。然而到了现代，真理常被视为社会运动的产物。我认为伯纳德·威廉斯并不完全接受这种观点。首先，他同意准确和真诚是社会合作的产物。但他指出，如果我们接受这些美德是在历史中形成的，那么这似乎也允许一种可能性，即我们在历史上也可以放弃它们。显然，威廉斯不接受这种推论，因为我们不能仅仅因为某些价值是历史形成的就将其抛弃。例如，语言是在历史中形成的，但放弃语言很可能就意味着退出了社会本身。他主张，准确和真诚是我们无法放弃的价值，因为它们已经成为我们社会必不可少的要素。我们需要真相，并不是因为它具有某种形而上学的地位，而是因为它构成了我们在社会中生存的骨架。因此，通过历史研究去揭露真相和认知美德的起源，并不一定会削弱它们的必要性。相反，一旦我们理解了这些认知美德是如何在历史中显现的，我们就会明白为什么它们在历史中是不可替代的。这是一种我们无法退出的生活方式。